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TAx LAw - CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - PENNSYLVANIA REALTY TRANSFER
TAXATION - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
Pennsylvania realty transfer tax does not violate the Supremacy
Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution, nor the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, where a non-exempt party is liable for realty transfer
tax in a transaction entered into with a party who is tax-exempt.
Wilson Partners, L.P v. Commonwealth, 737 A.2d 1215 (Pa. 1999)
cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 1171 (Feb. 22, 2000) (No. 99-1076).
Wilson Partners, L.P. and Academic Properties, Inc. (collectively,
the "Taxpayers") entered into separate, unrelated agreements with
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") for the
purchase of various parcels of property located in Pennsylvania.'
Pursuant to their respective agreements, the Taxpayers took title to
property and, in accordance with the Pennsylvania Realty Transfer
Act ("Act"), paid realty transfer tax of one-percent of the purchase
price to the Department of Revenue. 2 The Taxpayers subsequently
filed separate petitions with the Department of Revenue seeking
full or partial refunds on the ground that imposition of the Act
constitutes a violation of their rights under both the United States
and Pennsylvania Constitutions.3 Specifically, the Taxpayers
contended that the Act imposes an unequal tax burden upon
nonexempt parties entering into taxable real estate transactions
with tax-exempt parties.4 "According to [the] Taxpayers, such
inequality resulted from the fact that a nonexempt party must bear
exclusive liability to the Commonwealth for the taxes, whereas
parties transacting with other nonexempt parties share the liability
* Senior Staff Member, Volume 38, Duquesne Law Review; J.D. 2000, Duquesne
University School of Law; B.S. 1992, Saint Vincent College.
1. Wilson Partners, LP. v. Commonwealth, 737 A.2d 1215, 1216 (Pa. 1999).
2. Id. at 1216-17; see also 72 PA CONS. STAT. §§ 8101-C-8113-C (1982).
3. Wilson Partners, 737 A.2d at 1217.
4. Id.
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to the Commonwealth jointly and severally."5 The Taxpayers
claimed that this inequality constituted discrimination in violation
of the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution, as well as the Uniformity Clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. 6 "The Department of Revenue denied the
petitions, and the Board of Finance and Revenue affined."7
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed and
entered judgment in favor of the Commonwealth.8 President Judge
James Gardner Colins noted that the Act uniformly imposes a
single tax upon all transfers, with liability for the full amount of the
payment generally being shared jointly and severally among the
parties to the transaction, and with the parties being free to
discharge such liability in any agreed manner.9 Although the
scheme imposes exclusive liability upon a party transacting with a
tax-exempt entity, the commonwealth court rejected the Taxpayers'
claim that this results in either disparate treatment or inappropriate
classification. 10 The commonwealth court concluded that parties
who transact with the United States or other tax-exempt parties
simply are "no worse off" than parties who transact with
nonexempt parties.1 The commonwealth court also held that the
Act conformed to principles of uniformity and equal protection
5. Id. "Taxpayers characterized this circumstance as 'doubling' their tax liability." Id.
6. Wilson Partners, 737 A.2d at 1217. The Supremacy Clause requires that "[t]his
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Equal Protection
Clause provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. The
Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "[all taxes shall be
uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying
the tax, and shall be levied and collected under the general laws." PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
7. Wilson Partners, 737 A.2d at 1217.
S. Id. Wilson Partners, L.P. v. Commonwealth, 723 A.2d 1079 (Pa. Conmmw. Ct. 1999).
9. Wilson Partners, 723 A.2d at 1082.
10. Id. at 1083; see also Wilson Partners, 737 A.2d at 1217.
11. Id. at 1084. The Commonwealth Court drew its conclusion based upon the
following logic:
[c]ontrary to the Taxpayers' contentions, the exempt status of one party to a real
estate transfer transaction does not result in the other party paying twice the amount
of tax otherwise owed by that party . . .both parties to a transaction are liable for
the full amount of the transfer tax, and the classification of governmental parties as
exempt does nothing to increase the liability of a nonexempt party. As a practical
matter, in most taxable transfers the parties have apportioned the tax liability by
agreement. Where the parties have not agreed to apportion the amount of the transfer
tax, the liability inevitably falls upon the party that presents the instrument for
recording; that party may then seek contribution from the other party.
Id. at 1083.
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because any classification resulting under the Act rested upon a
reasonable distinction between governmental and non-governmental
parties to real estate transfer transactions.
12
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Justice Thomas G.
Saylor, writing for the court, noted that the Act imposes a
one-percent tax upon certain transfers of real estate property in the
Commonwealth. 13 Transfer tax liability is ordinarily shared jointly
and severally among the parties.14 Where the United States or the
Commonwealth are parties, they are exempt from the tax.15 In such
instances, transfer tax liability rests exclusively upon the
nonexempt party to the transaction, since the tax-exempt status of
one party does not relieve the other party from liability for the full
amount of the tax.16
The Taxpayers' first argument was that the Act discriminates
against parties dealing with the federal government in violation of
the Supremacy Clause.'7 Justice Saylor examined the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. United States.8 In
Washington, the United States sought to invalidate a state statute
which imposed a sales tax on construction materials used by
12. Id.
13. Wilson Partners, 737 A.2d at 1218. Specifically, the Pennsylvania Realty Transfer
Act provides that:
[e]very person who makes, executes, delivers, accepts or presents for recording any
document or in whose behalf any document is made, executed, delivered, accepted or
presented for recording, shall be subject to pay for and in respect to the transaction
or any part thereof, . . . a State tax at the rate of one per cent of the value of the
real estate represented by such document, which State tax shall be payable at the
earlier of the time the document is presented for recording or within thirty days of
acceptance of such document ....
72 PA_ CONS. STAT. § 8102-C (1982); see also 61 PA. CODE § 91.111(b) (2000). At the supreme
court, attorneys Joseph C. Bright and Kevin J. Moody represented Wilson Partners, L.P. and
Academic Properties, Inc., and attorney Ronald H. Skubecz, from the Office of Attorney
General, represented the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Attorney Jill M. Strouss
represented the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue. Id. at 1216.
Justice Thomas G. Saylor wrote for a unanimous court, including Chief Justice John P.
Flaherty, Jr. and Justices Stephen A. Zappala, Ralph J. Cappy, Ronald D. Castille, Russell M.
Nigro, and Sandra Schultz Newman. Id. at 1216.
14. Wilson Partners, 737 A.2d at 1218. See 72 PA_ CONS. STAT. § 8102-C (1982) and 61 PA
CODE § 91.111 (2000).
15. Wilson Partners, 737 A.2d at 1218. See 72 PA CONS. STAT. § 8102-C.2 (1982) and 61
PA CODE § 91.192 (2000). The federal exemption is consistent the federal government's
immunity from state taxation. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
(holding that the Bank of the United States was immune from a Maryland tax against it).
16. Wilson Partners, 737 A.2d at 1218. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8102-C.2 (1982) and 61
PA. CODE § 91.192 (2000).
17. Wilson Partners, 737 A.2d at 1218.
18. Id. See Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536 (1983).
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owners of construction projects, but, in the case of a federal
project, the owner was exempt and the contractor became
primarily liable.19 The United States argued that, because
contractors engaged in private construction projects were not
directly subject to the sales tax, the statute discriminated against
federal contractors in violation of the Supremacy Clause.20 The
Supreme Court focused on the economic burden of the tax upon
transactions between the federal government and its contractors
and not on the fact that federal contractors bore legal
responsibility to the state for a tax that other contractors did not
bear directly." The Supreme Court held that there was no
discrimination when the state merely shifts the legal incidence of
the tax in a non-discriminatory manner, provided that the
transaction is subject to an equivalent rate of tax and the state
does not deprive the parties of the opportunity to apportion the tax
burden among themselves.
22
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the principles from the
Washington decision and found that the realty transfer tax rate of
one-percent is equally applied to all transactions within the
Commonwealth. 23 The supreme court further noted that the Act
does not direct how the tax liability must be apportioned among
the parties and specifically states that such determination is left to
the parties.24 Thus, the supreme court held that there is no
discrimination when the Act merely removes liability from the
federal government, as required by federal immunity from state
taxation.
25
The Taxpayers' second argument was that the alleged unequal
burden imposed by the Act results in a violation of principles of
uniformity pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution and equal
protection under the United States Constitutions.26 Justice Saylor
noted that "[i]t is well established that, in matters of taxation, the
General Assembly possesses wide discretion, and a tax enactment
will not be invalidated unless it 'clearly, palpably, and plainly
violates the Constitution.' "27 The supreme court noted that it is the
19. Washington, 460 U.S. at 538.
20. Id. at 541-41.
21. Id. at 544.
22. Id. at 544-45.
23. Wilson Partners, 737 A.2d at 1219-20.
24. Id. at 1220.
25. Id. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
26. Wilson Partners, 737 A.2d at 1219-20.
27. Id. See Leonard v. Thornburgh, 489 A.2d 1349, 1351 (Pa 1985) (quoting
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taxpayer's burden, when challenging a tax statute, to demonstrate
that: first, the enactment results in some form of classification, and
second, such classification is unreasonable, in that it is not
rationally related to any legitimate state purpose.28 Both the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the
Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution do not require
absolute equality nor perfect uniformity in taxation, and any doubts
as to the constitutionality of the statute are to be resolved in favor
of upholding the statute.2 9 The supreme court applied the
Washington Court's rational with respect to the Supremacy Clause
challenge to the, Taxpayers' uniformity and equal protection
challenges.30 Justice Saylor affirmed the commonwealth court's
judgment and held that "the taxing scheme under the Act is
grounded in a rational basis, as it functions in a non-discriminatory
manner to ensure that equal revenues will be collected for all
non-excluded transfers of real estate occurring within the
Commonwealth."31 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari.
32
TAX LAw - STATE IMMUNITY - LOCAL REAL ESTATE TAXATION - The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania State
University is not an agency of the Commonwealth, and, therefore,
its medical center is subject to local real estate taxation.
Pennsylvania State University v. Derry Township School District,
731 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 1999).
The Pennsylvania State University ("PSU") is the owner and
operator of the Milton S. Hershey Medical Center ("HMC") located
in Derry Township, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.a3  HMC
encompasses PSU's medical school, dormitories, medical research
facilities, and two hospitals.-" In January of 1993, Derry Township
School District and the County of Dauphin notified PSU that, as of
Commonwealth v. Life Assurance Co. of Pa., 214 A.2d 209, 214 (Pa. 1965), appeal dismissed,
384 U.S. 268 (1966)).
28. Wilson Partners, 737 A.2d at 1220. See also Leonard, 489 A-2d at 1352.
29. Wilson Partners, 737 A.2d at 1220. See also Leonard, 489 A-2d at 1351; and Lee
Hosp. v. Cambria County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 638 A.2d 344, 351 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994), appeal discontinued, 648 A.2d 791 (Pa. 1994).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1221.
32. 120 S. Ct. 1171 (2000).
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January 1, 1993, the property of HMC would be subject to local real
estate taxation.35 Real estate bills were issued for the years 1993,
1994 and 1995.3 "PSU filed an appeal with the Dauphin County
Board of Assessment Appeals ("Board"); however, following
hearings, the Board denied PSU's appeal and found the Hershey
properties taxable."37 On appeal the Dauphin County Court of
Common Pleas reversed the Board's decision. s The Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court, affirming the court of common pleas
decision, held that HMC was immune from real estate taxation on
the basis that its owner, PSU, is an agency of the Commonwealth. 9
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Chief Justice John
P. Flaherty, Jr. noted that it is well established that real estate
owned by the Commonwealth and agencies of the Commonwealth
cannot be subject to taxation by political sulidivisions absent
express statutory authority.40 The supreme court had to determine
whether PSU is considered an agency of the Commonwealth.
41
Chief Justice Flaherty examined factors that suggested that PSU is
no longer considered an agency of the Commonwealth as it had
been previously determined in 1939.42 PSU's principal means of
revenue changed from primarily state and federal appropriations to
that of student tuition.4 3 In addition, the majority composition of
35. Pennsylvania State Univ. v. Derry Township Sch. Dist., 711 A 2d 615, 616 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1998).
36. Pennsylvania State Univ., 731 A.2d at 1273.
37. Pennsylvania State Univ., 711 A.2d at 616-17.
38. Id. at 617.
39. Id. Judge Rochelle S. Friedman held that PSU operates as an instrunentality of the
Commonwealth, functioning as an integral part of Pennsylvania by carrying out the state's
educational, research and public service missions and fulfilling the responsibilities that the
Commonwealth has required it to assume. Id. at 620.
40. Pennsylvania State Univ., 731 A.2d at 1273. See also Appeal of Bd. of Sch.
Directors of Owen J. Roberts Sch. Dist., 457 A-2d 1264, 1265 (Pa. 1983). At the supreme
court, attorneys James M. Home and R. Mark Faulkner from State College represented
Pennsylvania State University, attorney John W. Beatty from Erie represented Derry
Township School District, attorney Kenneth D. Chestek from Erie represented the County of
Dauphin, and attorney Carl G. Wass from Harrisburg represented Dauphin County Board of
Assessment Appeals. Pennsylvania State Univ., 731 A.2d at 1272-73.
Chief Justice John P. Flaherty, Jr. wrote the opinion for the court, joined by Justices
Stephen A. Zappala, Ralph J. Cappy, Ronald D. Castille, Sandra Schultz Newman, and
Thomas G. Saylor. Justice Russell M. Nigro concurred in the result. Id. at 1273, 1275.
41. Id.
42. Id. In Pennsylvania State College v. County of Centre, (No. 2 Equity November
Term 1937, filed August 24, 1939), the Centre County Court of Common Pleas held that
Pennsylvania State College, now PSU, was an agency of the Commonwealth.
43. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania State Univ. v. County of Centre, 615 A.2d 303, 306-07 (Pa.
1992)).
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PSU's board of trustees is no longer public or governmental in
nature as it had been in the past.44 The supreme court found that
without a governmental majority on the board of trustees the
authority to control and dispose of PSU's property is not within the
purview of the Commonwealth. 45 The supreme court reversed the
commonwealth court's decision and held that because the
Commonwealth does not control PSU's real property, PSU is not
immune from local real estate taxation.46 The case was remanded
to the court of common pleas for a determination of whether HMC
qualifies for exemption as an institution of purely public charity
under the General County Assessment Law, title 72, section
5020-204(a)(3) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes.
47
TAX LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PENNSYLVANIA SALES TAXATION -
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania sales
tax exemption for the sale of religious publications, Bibles, and
religious articles violates the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution.
Haller v. Commonwealth, 728 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1999) cert denied, 120
S. Ct. 325 (Oct. 12, 1999) (No. 99-154).
Felice Newman ("Newman") owns and operates Cleis Press, a
publishing company located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, whereby
all of the books purchased by Newman are subject to the
44. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania State Univ., 615 A.2d at 306-07). The board of trustees is
composed of thirty-two members, only ten of whom are public officials. Pennsylvania State
Univ., 731 A.2d at 1275.
45. Pennsylvania State Univ., 731 A-2d at 1273.
46. Id.
47. Id. Title 72, section 5020-204(a)(3) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
provides for an exemption from all county, city, borough, town, township, road, poor and
school tax, to:
[all hospitals, universities, colleges, seminaries, academies, associations and
institutions of learning, benevolence, or charity, including fire and rescue stations,
with the grounds thereto annexed and necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment of
the same, founded, endowed, and maintained by public or private charity: Provided,
That the entire revenue derived by the same be applied to the support and to increase
the efficiency and facilities thereof, the repair and the necessary increase of grounds
and buildings thereof, and for no other purpose: And provided further, That any
charitable organization providing residential housing services in which the charitable
nonprofit organization receives subsidies for at least ninety-five per centum of the
residential housing units from a low-income Federal housing program shall remain a
"purely public charity" and tax exempt provided that any surplus from such assistance
or subsidy is monitored by the appropriate governmental agency and used solely to
advance common charitable purposes within the charitable organization.
72 PA, CONS. STAT. § 5020-204(a)(3) (1982).
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Pennsylvania sales tax.48  Steve Zupcic ("Zulcic") purchased
religious books and non-religious books from various stores in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.49  Zupcic was not required to pay
Pennsylvania sales tax on the purchase of a Bible but was required
to pay sales tax on other religious and non-religious publications
not published by a religious organization. 50 Pennsylvania sales tax
does not apply to sales of religious publications, Bibles and other
religious articles sold by religious groups.51 Newman and Zupcic
filed this action in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court against
the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue, seeking an injunction
prohibiting enforcement of the sales tax exemption and a
declaratory judgment that the exemption violates: (1) the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) Article
I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution; (3) the Press Clause
of the United States Constitution; and, (4) Article I, Section 7 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.52 The commonwealth court, en banc,
48. Haller v. Commonwealth, 693 A.2d 266, 267 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
49. Ha//er, 693 A.2d at 267.
50. Id.
51. Title 72, section 7204(28) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes provides that
"the [sales] tax imposed by section 202 shall not be imposed upon the sale at retail or use of
religious publications sold by religious groups and Bibles and religious articles." 72 Pk CONS.
STAT. § 7204(28) (1982). Title 61, section 31.3(22) of the Pennsylvania Code provides that "the
[sales] tax does not apply to . . . religious publications sold by religious groups. Sales or
use of Bibles and religious articles are exempt." 61 PA. CODE § 31.3(22) (2000) (repealed
2000).
52. Hailer v. Commonwealth, 728 A.2d 351, 352 (Pa. 1999). Henry Hailer was also a
plaintiff, but he was subsequently dismissed as a party by the commonwealth court for lack
of standing. Hailer, 693 A.2d at 267 n. 4.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.. . " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Article 1, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads as follows:
All men have natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect
or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no
human authority can, in any case whatever,* control or interfere with the rights of
conscience, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious
establishments or modes of worship.
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
The Press Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . .
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Article 1, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads as follows:
The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake to examine the
proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of government, and no law shall ever be
made to restrain the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions
is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and
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held that the sales tax exemption violated the Establishment Clause
of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 3 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution for failure to serve a secular purpose
since the sales tax exemption is based solely on the religious
nature of the items sold or the entity selling them.5
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that according to the
Lemon test, in order for a governmental action to survive an
Establishment Clause challenge, the state must show that: (1) the
action serves a secular purpose; (2) the action's principal or
primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and (3) the action does not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.14 With respect to the first prong
requiring that the exemption have a secular purpose, writing for the
court, Justice Sandra Schultz Newman applied the breadth of
coverage standard.55 Under the breadth of coverage standard, if
there is a determination that the Pennsylvania sales tax exemption
was aimed at establishing, sponsoring or supporting religion or
religious messages, then the exemption does not have a secular
purpose.56 If, on the other hand, there is a determination that the
tax exemption's legitimate purpose was to contribute to the
community's moral and intellectual diversity or encourage private
print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. No conviction
shall be had in any prosecution for the publication of papers relating to the official
conduct of officers or men in public capacity, or to any other matter proper for public
investigation or information, where the fact that such publication was not maliciously
or negligently made shall be established to the satisfaction of the jury; and in all
indictments for libels the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts,
under the direction of the court, as in other cases.
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
53. Haller, 693 A.2d at 274. Judge James R. Kelley wrote the opinion for the
commonwealth court. The commonwealth court did not make a ruling on the Press Clause
argument.
54. Haller, 728 A.2d at 352. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that a
Rhode Island statue that provided state supplemental payments to religious school teachers
violated the Religious Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution).
At the supreme court, attorneys David J. Millstein and Witold J. Walczak from Pittsburgh
represented Felice Newman and Steve Zupcic. The Commonwealth of Revenue, Department
of Revenue and Robert A. Judge, Sr., Secretary of the Department of Revenue, were
represented by John G. Knorr, III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Gregory R.
Neuhauser, Sr., Deputy Attorney General. Haler, 728 A.2d at 351.
Justice Sandra Schultz Newman wrote the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice
John P. Flaherty, Jr., and Justices Stephen A. Zappala, Ralph J. Cappy, Ronald D. Castille,
Russell M. Nigro, and Thomas G. Saylor. Id.
55. Hailer, 728 A.2d at 354.
56. Id. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (citing Walz v. Tax
Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
2000
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groups to undertake projects that advance the community's
well-being that would otherwise have to be funded by tax revenues.
then the exemption has a secular purpose.
57
The supreme court affirmed the commonwealth court's judgment
and held that the Pennsylvania sales tax exemption pursuant to
title 72, section 7204(28) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
violates the Establishment Clause of the United States.5s The court
noted that according to the breadth of coverage standard the
exemption does not have a secular purpose.59 In addition, the fact
that the Commonwealth offers other sales tax exemptions for
different purposes does not save section 7204(28) from violating
the Establishment Clause.60 On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
61
Subsequent to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding, the
Pennsylvania Department of Revenue amended title 61, section 31.1
of the Pennsylvania Code by deleting paragraph (22) relating to
religious publications sold by religious groups.
62
TAX LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATE
TAXATION - The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that the
three-factor apportionment formula does not violate the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution as applied to
taxpayers with subsidiaries, but such taxpayers are entitled to
statutory equitable relief under the special apportionment provision
set forth in the Pennsylvania Tax Code.
Unisys Corporation v. Commonwealth, 726 A.2d 1096 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1999).
57. Haller, 728 A.2d at 354. See Texas Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 12 (citing WaLz, 397
U.S. at 674.)
58. Haler, 728 A.2d at 355.
59. Id. at 355-56. The court stated that it is not suggesting that the Establishment
Clause prohibits the Pennsylvania legislature from exempting religious publications from
taxation. Id. at 356. An exemption would pass Establishment Clause scrutiny if it benefits
non-religious publications equally with religious publications and provides an overall secular
purpose. Id.
60. Id. at 356. For example, caskets and brook trout are exempt from sales tax
pursuant to title 72, sections 7204(31) and (42) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes.
See title 72, sections 7204(1)-(57) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes for complete list
of sales tax exclusions.
61. 120 S. Ct. 325 (1999).
62. 30 Pa. Bull. 1654 (2000). The Department of Revenue has authority to "prescribe,
adopt, promulgate and enforce, rules and regulations relating to any matter or thing
pertaining to the administration and enforcement of the provisions of this article, and the
collection of taxes, penalties and interest imposed by this article" pursuant to title 72,
section 7270 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes.
Vol. 38:887
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Unisys Corporation ("Unisys") petitioned the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court for review of three orders of the
Pennsylvania Board of Finance and Revenue ("Board"), which
affirmed the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue's ("Department")
settlement of Unisys' 1986 franchise tax return and its successor
company Sperry Corporation's 1985 and 1986 franchise tax
retums.63 The Pennsylvania franchise tax was designed to tax
out-of-state corporations conducting business within Pennsylvania
and is imposed on the capital stock value of the corporation.64 In
63. Unisys Corporation v. Commonwealth, 726 A.2d 1096, 1098 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
Unisys, a Delaware corporation with its principal office in Blue Bell, Pennsylvania, does
business in all fifty states. Id. at 1099. Unisys owned, directly or indirectly, the stock of more
than 100 domestic and foreign subsidiaries doing business in more than 100 countries around
the world. Id.
Before the commonwealth court, attorney Joseph C. Bright from Philadelphia represented
Unisys Corporation, and Kevin A. Moury, Senior Deputy Attorney General from Harrisburg,
represented the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id.
Judge Bonnie Brigance Leadbetter wrote the opinion for the commonwealth court, joined
by President Judge James Gardner Colins, and Judges Doris A. Smith, Rochelle S. Friedman,
and James J. Flaherty. Id. at 1098. Judge Joseph T. Doyle dissented without opinion. Id. at
1105. Judge Dante R. Pellegrini filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1105-08 (Pellegrini, J.,
dissenting).
64. Id. at 1098. Title 72, section 7602(b) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
provides that:
Every foreign entity from which a report is required under section 601 hereof, shall be
subject to and pay to the department annually, a franchise tax which is the greater of
(i) three hundred dollars ($ 300) or (ii) the amount computed at the rates provided in
subsection (h) upon each dollar of the capital stock value as defined in section 601(a),
upon a taxable value to be determined in the following manner. The capital stock
value shall be ascertained in the manner prescribed in section 601(a) of this article.
The taxable value shall then be determined by employing the relevant apportionment
factors set forth in Article IV: provided, that the manufacturing, processing, research
and development exemptions contained under section 602(a) shall also apply to
foreign corporations and in determining the relevant apportionment factors the
numerator of the property, payroll, or sales factors shall not include any property,
payroll or sales attributable to manufacturing, processing, research or development
activities in the Commonwealth: and provided further that except for the imposition
of the minimum tax set forth in this section, the provisions of this section shall not
apply to the taxation of so much of the capital stock value attributable to student loan
assets owned or held by an entity created for the securitization of student loans or by
a trustee on its behalf. Any foreign corporation, joint-stock association, limited
partnership or company subject to the tax prescribed herein may elect to compute
and pay its tax under section 602(a): provided, that any foreign corporation,
joint-stock association, limited partnership or company electing to compute and pay
its tax under section 602(a) shall be treated as if it were a domestic corporation for
the purpose of determining which of its assets are exempt from taxation and for the
purpose of determining the proportion of the value of its capital stock which is
subject to taxation. The provisions of this article shall apply to the taxation of entities
organized for manufacturing, processing, research or development purposes, but shall
not apply to such entities as enjoy and exercise the right of eminent domain.
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calculating the franchise tax, the corporation must first determine
its capital stock value by statutory formula based upon three
amounts: (1) the corporation's net worth, (2) the net worth of any
subsidiary of the reporting corporation, and (3) the corporation's
average net income including dividends received from its
subsidiaries. 65 The corporation must then determine taxable value
by multiplying the capital stock value by the apportionment
factor.66
Because a state may not constitutionally tax a corporation's
capital stock value earned outside of the Commonwealth, title 72,
section 7602(b) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes provides
corporations with two options of apportioning its capital stock
value attributable to business activities conducted within the
Commonwealth.6 The first method is the single factor method,
which is the ratio of the corporation's total real and certain
tangible assets located within the Commonwealth over the
corporation's total assets located everywhere. 68 The second method
is the three-factor method.69 The three-factor method is calculated
by taking the average of three ratios: (1) property within
Pennsylvania over total property everywhere, (2) payroll incurred
in Pennsylvania over total payroll incurred everywhere, and (3)
sales within Pennsylvania over total sales everywhere. 70 When
calculating the three-factor apportionment factor it is the
Department's practice to use only the reporting corporation's
72 PA_ CONS. STAT. § 7602(b) (1982).
65. Id. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7601(a) (1982); see also 61 PA CODE §§ 155.26 and 155.27
(2000). Pursuant to title 61, sections 155.27(a) and (b) of the Pennsylvania Code, a
corporation's net worth is calculated as follows:
(a) Net worth is the sum of the taxpayer's issued and outstanding capital stock,
surplus and undivided profits as per books set forth on the income tax return filed by
the taxpayer with the Federal government, or if no return is made, as would have
been set forth had a return been made.
(b) In the case of a taxpayer which has investments in the common stock of another
corporation, net worth is the consolidated net worth of the taxpayer computed in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Book value for investments
of stock of other corporations includes original cost plus the investor's share of the
investee's earnings or losses. For the purpose of this subsection, investments in the
common stock of another corporation means investments which shall be accounted
for using the equity method of accounting or which shall be consolidated under
generally accepted accounting principles.
61 PA. CODE § 155.27(a) and (b) (2000).
66. Unisys Corp., 726 A.2d at 1099.
67. Id.
68. Id. See also 72 PA_ CONS. STAT. § 1896 (1982); 61 PA. CODE § 155.10 (2000).
69. Unisys Corp., 726 A.2d at 1099.
70. Unisys Corp., 726 A.2d at 1099; 72 PA CONS. STAT. § 7602(b)(1) (1982).
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property, payroll and sales and not the property, payroll and sales
of any subsidiary of the reporting corporation.7' Thus, there is an
inconsistency in the formula for calculating Pennsylvania franchise
tax liability because capital stock value is determined on the
consolidated group basis and the apportionment factor is
determined using the activity of only the reporting corporation.
72
In the years at issue, with respect to the Pennsylvania franchise
tax, Unisys reported average net income of the reporting
corporation only, less dividend income from its subsidiaries. 73 In
addition, Unisys reported capital stock value of the reporting
corporation only and elected to apportion Pennsylvania operations
using the three-factor method.74 The Department, however,
increased the amount reported by Unisys as average net income by
adding dividend income from subsidiaries and also increased net
worth to include the value of Unisys' subsidiaries. 75 The
Department recalculated Unisys' three-factor apportionment factor
to include the property, payroll, and sales of the reporting
corporation only.76
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court addressed the issue of
whether the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution required the Commonwealth to include
in the three-factor apportionment factor the property, payroll and
sales of the reporting corporation's subsidiaries and, if not, whether
the Pennsylvania statutory scheme mandates administrative relief.
77
Judge Bonnie Brigance Leadbetter noted that the Commerce Clause
prohibits a state from taxing value earned outside its boarders.
78
Where earnings attributable to a particular state cannot be
determined with precision, the Commonwealth may allocate such
earnings using statutorily defined apportionment methods.
79
The Due Process Clause requires that the apportionment
methods adopted by the states must be fair. 0 The commonwealth
court stated that it becomes increasingly difficult to arrive at a
precise apportionment method in situations where the reporting
71. Unisys Corp., 726 A.2d at 1099.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1100.
74. Id.
75. Id.






Duquesne Law Review Vol. 38:887
corporation is part of a multi-state or multi-national organization.8'
Judge Leadbetter noted that the United States Supreme Court held
in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board2 that in
instances where a taxpayer is part of a multi-jurisdictional
organization, the taxable value and apportionment factor should be
determined using the entire organization as a whole, also known as
the unitary business enterprise.83
Unisys first argued that applying the Department's apportionment
method of only using the reporting corporation's property, payroll,
and sales activity, and not the activity of the reporting corporation's
subsidiaries, is fundamentally unfair and violates the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution.84 Unisys believed that the
Due Process Clause mandates that in calculating taxable value a
reporting corporation must multiply its consolidated capital stock
value by its consolidated apportionment factor.85 The
commonwealth court then examined four United States Supreme
Court cases where the apportionment factors of various state tax
codes were challenged urfder the Due Process Clause. In Hans
Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell,86 the Court held
that the Due Process Clause was violated when there was a 264
percent difference between actual taxable income and apportioned
taxable income.87 The Court in Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v.
Missouri State Tax Comm'ns8 held that a 166 percent difference
81. Unisys Corp., 726 A-2d at 1100.
82. 463 U.S. 159 (1983). The United States Supreme Court in Container Corp. noted
that when the taxpayer is part of a multi-jurisdictional organization, the unitary business
formula apportionment may be used. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 165. This method
calculates local tax by defining the scope of the "unitary business" of which the taxpayer's
activities in the state form one party, and apportioning the total income of that "unitary
business" between the state and the rest of the world based on a formula taking into
account objective measures of the taxpayer's activities within and without the state. Id. "A
unitary business is one where there is some sharing or exchange of value not capable of
precise identification or measurement which renders unitary business formula apportionment
a reasonable method of taxation." Id.
83. Unisys Corp., 726 A.2d at 1100.
84. Id. at 1101.
85. Id.
86. 283 U.S. 123 (1931). In Hans Rees' Sons, the taxpayer challenged the
constitutionality of the North Carolina's single-factor apportionment method based entirely
on ownership of tangible property. Hans Rees' Sons, 283 U.S. at 124. The taxpayer proved
that under the apportionment factor, 80 percent of the taxpayer's income was subject to tax,
while 22 percent of the taxpayer's income was actually generated in the state. Id. at 134.
87. Unisys Corp., 726 k2d at 1102.
88. 390 U.S. 317 (1968). In Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., Missouri calculated the
taxpayer's tax by multiplying the ratio derived from taking the number of miles of track
within the state divided by the total number of track miles in the United States times the
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between the taxable value calculated by the state and the actual
taxable value violates the Due Process Clause.8 9 The Court in
Container Corp. concluded that a fourteen-percent difference
between the taxable value using state apportionment factors and
the taxpayer's calculated value was not unfair as to violate the Due
Process Clause.90 Finally, in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair,9' the court
held that a forty-eight percent difference was not unfair
2
The commonwealth court concluded that Unisys did not
demonstrate a due process violation.93 Unisys claimed that if the
unitary business formula was used, its tax liability would be
forty-five percent less than the tax calculated by the Department.9 4
The commonwealth court held that a forty-five percent disparity is
not ungrossly unfair as to constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause.9
5
Unisys next argued that it was entitled to statutory equitable
relief under the special apportionment provision set forth in title
72, section 7401(3)2.(a)(18) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated
Statutes ("Subsection (18)").9 The Department claimed that
Subsection (18) was not applicable to Unisys' situation because it
total value of all the taxpayer's rolling stock. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 390 U.S. at 320. The
taxpayer was able to offer proof that the actual value of the rolling stock located within the
state was three percent, while the track mile apportionment method calculated taxable value
of eight percent. Id. at 324.
89. Unisys Corp., 726 k2d at 1102-03.
90. Id. at 1103. The taxpayer in Container Corp. argued that the application of the
three-factor apportionment method was not accurate because the formula utilizes indirect
measures of income, i.e., property, payroll and sales.) Container Corp, 463 U.S. at 181.
91. 437 U.S. 267 (1978). In Moorman Mfg. Co., Iowa authorized the use of the
single-factor method and not the use of the three-factor method. Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S.
at 275. The taxpayer argued its taxes would decrease utilizing the three-factor method. Id.




96. Id. TItle 72, section 7401(3)2.(a)(18) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
provides that:
If the allocation and apportionment provisions of this definition do not fairly represent
the extent of the taxpayer's business activity in this state, the taxpayer may petition
the Secretary of Revenue or the Secretary may require, in respect to all or any part of
the taxpayer's business activity: (A) separate accounting; (B) the exclusion of any one
or more of the factors; (C) the inclusion of one or more additional factors which will
fairly represent the taxpayer's business activity in this state; or (D) the employment of
any other method to effectuate an equitable allocation and apportionment of the
taxpayer's income. In determining the fairness of any allocation or apportionment, the
Secretary of Revenue may give consideration to the taxpayer's previous reporting and
its consistency with the requested relief.
72 PA_ CONS. STAT. § 7401(3)2.(a)(18) (1982).
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is only to be used in "quirky," nonrecurring situations, and to avoid
constitutional infractions. 97 The commonwealth court held that
Subsection (18) was applicable to Unisys' situation and that the
Department abused its discretion in refusing to adjust Unisys'
allocation share under Subsection (18).98 Judge Leadbetter noted
that although a forty-five percent variance in tax due does not
violate the Due Process Clause, it does, however, require relief
under Subsection (18).9
Judge Joseph T. Doyle dissented without opinion. Judge Dante R.
Pellegrini dissented, agreeing with the majority that there was no
Due Process Clause violation, but disagreeing that Subsection (18)
required the Department to afford relief.1°0 Judge Pellegrini stated
that Subsection (18) only requires relief where the disparity is
unconstitutional, and not where the disparity is something less than
unconstitutional. 101
97. Unisys Corp., 726 A.2d at 1104.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1105.
100. Id. (Pellegrini, J., dissenting). Judge Pellegrini was of the opinion that a forty-five
percent disparity is not unfair. Id. at 1107 (Pellegrini, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Pellegrini, J., dissenting). Judge Pellegrini stated that Subsection (18) applies
in situations where the apportionment is unfair, unconstitutional, and does not fairly
represent the taxpayer's actual business activity in the Commonwealth. Id. at 1108
(Pellegrini, J., dissenting).
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